HAMMOND V. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH:

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ISSUE-AN EXERCISE
IN JUDICIAL LETHARGY

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hammond v. North Slope Borough, I the Alaska Supreme
Court reviewed the propriety of Alaska's decision to lease offshore
tracts in the Beaufort Sea for oil and gas exploration and development. The lease decision was alleged to violate federal and state environmental statutes. 2 This note will analyze the Hammond court's

such statute, the federal Endangered Species
interpretation of one
3

Act of 1973 (ESA).
The Beaufort Sea and surrounding areas are habitat of the bow-5
head and gray whales,4 species listed as endangered under the ESA.

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA protects these species from harm caused
by federally sponsored activities. The section requires each federal
agency to insure that any action "authorized, funded, or carried out
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982).
2. The federal statutes involved included: the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982), the Marine Mammal Protection Act, id §§ 1361-84
(1982), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, id §§ 703-12 (1982). The state statutes
alleged to have been violated were: Alaska's Endangered Species Act, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 16.20.180-.210 (1983), Alaska's Coastal Management Act, id.
§§ 46.40.010-.210 (1982), the Alaska Public Meetings Act, id §§ 44.62.310-.312
(1980), and the Alaska Lands Act, id §§ 38.05.005-.370 (1977). Hammond, 645 P.2d
at 756-57.
For an overview of the Hammond court's analysis of the alleged state violations, see Note, EnvironmentalLaw: Oil, Eskimos and the Beaufort Sea - Round II
- Hammond v. North Slope Borough (Alaska 1982), 12 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REV.
167 (1983).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982). Specifically, the court dealt with an alleged
violation of section 7(a)(2) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (amending the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
4. For a general discussion of the bowhead and gray whales, see Alaska
Whales and Whaling, 5 ALASKA GEOGRAPHIC (1978).
5. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1982).
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by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued exist-

ence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species."' 6 Be-

cause the exploration activities stemming from the joint federal-state
lease sale would have had a direct impact on the endangered whales'
environment, it was contended that the Commissioner of the Alaska
Department of
Natural Resources failed to satisfy the section 7(a)(2)
7
requirement.
Whether an agency will be judged to have complied with section 7(a)(2) depends in large part on the standard of review applied
by the courts. If the courts subject agency compliance to a reasonableness standard of review,8 then the burden is placed on a third
party to show that the agency action is likely "to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species" (hereinafter referred to
as "jeopardize").9 If the courts employ a scrutinizing standard of

review, 10 the burden is placed on the agency to show its action is not

likely to "jeopardize."
In deciding to apply a reasonableness standard of review, the
Hammond court adopted the United States District of Columbia
Court of Appeals' holding in North Slope Borough v. Andrus. 11 The

Hammond court concluded: "[InAndrus] the United States Court of
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (amending the Endangered Species Act of
1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
7. Section 7(a)(2), by its terms, applies only to a 'Federal agency." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (1982). "Federal agency" is defined to include "any department,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(7) (1982). Ordinarily, then, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources would not be considered
a "Federal agency." Nonetheless, there are situations when state and federal involvement is sufficiently intertwined that a plausible argument can be made that the
state is an "instrumentality of the United States." Hammond, involving a joint federal-state lease sale, presents this situation. Because of the substantial interaction
between federal and state agencies, it is at least debatable that the Alaska Department of Natural Resources was an "instrumentality of the United States." Since the
Hammond court did not address the issue, this note will treat the Alaska Department of Natural Resources as a "Federal agency" for the purposes of section 7(a)(2)
and the Hammond litigation.
8. A reasonableness standard of review refers to a court examining section
7(a)(2) compliance in terms of the following inquiry: did the agency "reasonably
conclude" that its actions would not be likely to jeopardize endangered species? See
infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (amending the Endangered Species Act of
1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
10. A scrutinizing standard of review refers to a court examining section 7(a)(2)
compliance in terms of the following inquiry: did the agency amply demonstrate
that its actions would not be likely to jeopardize endangered species? See infra
notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
11. 642 F.2d 589, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 45-
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Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, held that there was no violation of federal acts with regard to the federal portion of the Beaufort
Sea lease sale. . . .Forthe same reasons, we hold likewise in the case
at bar."' 2 The Alaska Supreme Court neither discussed nor explained its basis for adopting the Andrus holding. Instead, the Hammond court treated the Andrus reasoning as black letter law,
universally accepted by all courts.
This note will show that by adhering to the Andrus reasoning
and applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Alaska
Supreme Court has perpetuated the error of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals - a misreading of the congressional mandate in
and intent behind section 7 of the ESA. In order to demonstrate that
Congress intended more than a reasonableness standard of review,
that in fact Congress affirmatively placed the burden on agencies to
prove that their actions do not jeopardize endangered species, this
note will examine the legislative history behind the 1973 ESA, cases
interpreting section 7 of the ESA, the 1978 and 1979 amendments to
the ESA, and cases interpreting Section 7(a)(2) of the amended ESA.

II. THE ENDANGERED SPEcIEs ACT OF 1973
Section 7 of the 1973 ESA provides:
All other Federal departments and agencies shall... utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act... by taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by them do notjeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species
13

The historical development of Section 7 demonstrates that Congress
sought to provide maximum protection for endangered species.
Consistent with this goal is an imputed intent of Congress to place
on the agency the affirmative burden of insuring that its actions do
not jeopardize endangered species.
The ESA of 1973 followed earlier attempts to protect endangered species. In 1966, Congress passed the first endangered species
legislation.' 4 Section l(b) of the Endangered Species Act of 1966
declared:
The Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of Defense, together with the heads of bureaus, agencies,
and services within their departments, shallseek to protect species
12. 645 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
13. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (emphasis added), amended by 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
14. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, repealed
by Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, 903.
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of native fish and wildlife.

that are threatened with extinction,

and, insofar as ispracticable and consistent with the primarypur-

poses of such bureaus, agencies, and services, shall preserve the
habitats of 5 such threatened species on lands under their
jurisdiction.'

The qualifying language in the 1966 Act, "shall seek to," "insofar as
is practicable," and "consistent with their primary purpose," gave
substantial discretion to agencies to determine the amount of protection they needed to afford endangered species. The Endangered
Species Conservation Act, enacted in 1969, broadened restrictions on
not alter the
the commercial taking of endangered species, but did
6
requirements imposed on agencies by the 1966 Act.'
The enactment of the ESA of 1973 was a recognition by Congress that the agency guidelines set forth in the 1966 Act were insufficient to ensure the protection of endangered species. Thus, even
though a substantial majority of bills introduced into the hearings
contained a qualification similar to that found in the earlier 1966
statute,' 7 the final version of section 7 contained no qualifying language. Under section 7 of the 1973 ESA, agencies no longer were
directed to conserve species "insofar as practicable" or "consistent
with their primary purposes;""' rather, agencies had an affirmative
obligation to ensure that their actions "do not" jeopardize endangered species.' 9 The manager of the House bill, Representative
Dingell, commented on the protection offered by the version of section 7 that was eventually adopted:
We have substantially amplified the obligation of both agencies,
and other agencies of Government as well, to take steps within
their power to carry out the purposes of this act. . . . It appears
15. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(b), 80 Stat. 926
(emphasis added).
16. Endangered Species Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275
(1969), repealedby Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
884, 903.
17. See H.R. 37, 470, 471, 1511, 2669, 3696, 3795, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(d)
(1973) ("All other Federal departments and agencies shall .

.

. utilize, wherever

practicable,their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying
out programs for the protection of endangered species and by taking such actions as
may be necessary to insure that actions ... do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species." (emphasis added)); id § 2(c) (policy of Congress that
agencies protect endangered species "wherever practicable"); H.R. 1461, 4755, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (agencies to utilize their authorities, "where practicable," to
accomplish goals of Act); H.R. 4758, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(b), 3(d) (agencies to
carry out purposes of Act "insofar as is practicable and consistent with [their] primary purposes"); H.R. 2735, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(d) (agencies to insure protection of endangered species "wherever practicable"); S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 5(d) (agencies to insure protection of endangered species "wherever practicable").
18. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(b), 80 Stat. 926.
19. Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
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that the whooping cranes of this country. . . are being threatened
by Air Force bombing activities along the gulf coast of Texas.
Under existing law, the Secretary of Defense has some discretion
as to whether or not he will take the necessary action to see that
this threat disappears. . . . The point that I wish to make is that
once this bill is enacted, he or any subsequent Secretary of Defense would be required to take the proper steps ...
[T]he agencies of Governments can no longer plead that they
nothing about it. They can, and they must. The law is
can do
20
clear.
Representative Dingell's remarks, as well as the plain language
of section 7 of the 1973 ESA, evince Congress' objective to place the
burden on agencies to prove that agency actions do not "jeopardize"
endangered species. Failure by the judiciary to adhere to this approach is plainly inconsistent with congressional intent.
III.

JUDICIAL REvIEW UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE 1973 ESA

Four cases interpreted section 7 of the 1973 ESA prior to the
1978 and 1979 amendments; all but one placed the burden of proof
on the agency to show that agency actions were not "jeopardizing"
endangered species. 2 ' The only case that did not place the burden
on the agency was Sierra Club v. Froehlke.22 In light of the analyses
offered by the other three courts, the Sierra Club court's interpretation of section 7 must be regarded as a misguided aberration.
At issue in Sierra Club was the construction of a dam alleged to
jeopardize the endangered Indiana bat. The biological opinion received by the acting agency, the Corps of Engineers (Corps), recommended that construction of the dam not proceed until the effects of
the dam could be ascertained. 23 Ignoring this opinion, and asserting
that "the Project would probably have no more than an infinitesimal
effect upon the Indiana bat population," 24 the Corps proceeded immediately with construction. In review of the Corps' decision, the
Sierra Club court concluded that construction of the dam would not
violate section 7 because "the evidence failed to show that any of the
defendants' present activities . . . are adversely affecting Indiana

bats in the project area."' 25 In effect, the court held that because the
20. 119

CONG.

REc. 42, 913 (1973).

21. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289
(8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
22. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
23. See id at 1305.
24. Id
25. Id (quoting the lower court opinion, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F. Supp.

130, 138 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
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Sierra Club had not produced sufficient evidence to show
'jeopardization" of the Indiana bat, the agency had fulfilled its section 7 obligations. Thus, the burden was placed by the court on a
third party, the Sierra Club, to show "jeopardization," rather than
on the acting agency, the Corps of Engineers, to prove "no
jeopardization."
National Wildife Federation v. Coleman,26 decided at approximately the same time as Froehlke, provides a different interpretation
of section 7. Although the Coleman opinion might appear to have
placed the burden on a third party to demonstrate "jeopardization,"
the court in fact placed the burden on the agency to demonstrate "no
jeopardization." The court stated that "appellants have the burden
of proving that the appellees have failed to take the action necessary
to insure that the 5.7 mile segment of 1-10 does not jeopardize the
continued existence of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane . ... 27 To
satisfy this burden, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) had
only to show that the acting agency, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), had failed in its "burden of insuring that its actions
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the crane."' 28 The
FHWA was deemed to have failed in its burden of proof when sufficient evidence was adduced by the NWF to show that it was "questionable" whether the crane could survive the additional loss of
habitat caused by the indirect effects of the highway. 29 By adopting
the "questionable" standard, the Coleman court clearly placed the
burden on the agency to show "no jeopardization."
Nebraska v. RuralElectrfcationAdministration,30 the third case
which interpreted section 7, is in accord with the Coleman court's
interpretation of section 7. The Nebraska court, however, went further than the Coleman court by explicitly rejecting the reasoning in
Sierra Club. Responding to the defendant's contention that no adverse impact on the whooping crane had been demonstrated, the
Nebraska court emphasized:
The [ESA] places the burden upon the agencies who are authorizing, funding, or carrying out programs to insure that those programs do not jeopardize endangered species or the habitat of the
species. The burden is not upon someone else to demonstrate that
there will be an adverse impact ....
Unless [the Rural Electrification Administration
has
met
this
burden,]
it has not complied
with the Act.3 1
26. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).

27. Id at 372.
28. Id at 374.
29. Id at 373.
30. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).

31. Id at 1171.
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Consistent with the interpretation accorded section 7 by the
courts in Nebraska and Coleman, the Supreme Court implied in TVA
to demonstrate that
v. Hill32 that the burden is on the acting agency
33
it is not jeopardizing any endangered species.
TVA, Coleman, and Nebraska illustrate the proper interpretation of section 7: consistent with the plain language of the section
and its legislative history, the burden is placed on an acting agency
to demonstrate that its actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.
Following the TV decision, the 1973 enactment of the ESA
was amended. Section 7, as amended, 34 continues to place the responsibility on agencies to prove that their activities do not threaten
endangered species.
IV.

THE

1978 AND 1979 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 7 OF THE
1973 ESA

The primary goal of Congress in amending section 7 of the 1973
ESA was to insert flexibility into the decisionmaking process. 35 To
accomplish this purpose, amended section 7 set forth elaborate pro32. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
33. The Court undertook an extensive review of the legislative history and concluded that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting the statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost," id at 184, and that
section 7 "reveals an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford
first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species ... . Id
at 185. Because the Court was willing to enforce this congressional directive, it follows that the Court interprets section 7 as placing the burden of insuring "no jeopardy" on agencies.
See also Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1156, 1171 (D. Neb. 1978) (placement of the burden on an agency to show it has
insured the safety of endangered species "is one of the principal teachings" of TVA
v.Hill).
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536a-1536p (1982).
35. In discussing the reason for its proposed amendments, the House report
stated:
The purpose of the legislation is. . .to introduce some flexibility into the
Act. To accomplish this purpose, the legislation adopts a procedure
through which Federal agencies may be considered for an exemption from
the Act's mandate that they not jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species ....
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 9453. The House concluded that the exemption process is necessary in
order to "allow consideration of those cases where a Federal action cannot be completed or its objectives cannot be met without directly conflicting with the requirements of Section 7." H.R. REP. No. 1625, 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9463.
The Senate echoed the House's belief that an exemption process is necessary
and would result in the desired degree of flexibility. S. REP.No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1978).
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cedures
for obtaining an exemption from the requirements of the
36
Act.

The language of the amended section 7 demonstrates Congress'

continuing intent to place the burden on the agency to shown "no
jeopardization." The section provides:
Each Federal agency shall ... insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species . . .37
The only substantial change between the revised section 7(a)(2)

and the original section 7 is that the original "does not jeopardize"
standard is replaced by an "is not likely to jeopardize" mandate. Because there is no legislative history explaining the rationale for this
change, one can only speculate as to its purpose. The most logical
explanation is that this new language provides section 7 with the
desired flexibility that was the dominant theme throughout the 1978

and 1979 amendment hearings.38 For example, the original "does
not jeopardize" language gave agencies no leeway; they were re-

quired to take actions to protect endangered species even against unforeseeable contingencies. In contrast, the revised language, "is not
likely to jeopardize," is a more attainable requirement since it does
not require agencies to guard against unforeseeable contingencies. If
the sole effect of the change in language, then, is to protect against
unforeseeable happenings, it must be concluded that the amended
section 7 still imposes on agencies an affirmative obligation to ensure
protection of endangered species. It therefore follows that the bur36. To obtain an exemption from the section 7(a)(2) mandate, an agency must
first apply to the Secretary of Interior (or, under certain situations, the Secretary of
Commerce). 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1) (1982). An application will be processed only if
the agency has been issued a negative biological opinion (that is, the opinion indicates that the agency action would violate section 7(a)(2)). Id § 1536(g)(1). The
Secretary is to recommend exemption if he finds the following requirements are
satisfied: the agency has carried out its statutory responsibilities in "good faith," it
has attempted to find alternatives which would not violate section 7(a)(2), it has
conducted the necessary biological assessments, and it has refrained from making
prohibited irreversible commitments of resources. Id §§ 1536(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii). The
Secretary is to deny an exemption if these requirements are not met. Id
§ 1536(g)(3)(B). If the Secretary recommends exemption, the application is then
reviewed by the Endangered Species Committee. Id § 1536(g)(4). The Committee
is to grant an exemption if it finds: there are no alternatives to the agency action,
the benefits of allowing the action are much greater than the benefits of conserving
the species or its critical habitat, the agency action is in the public interest, the action
is of regional or national consequence, and there has been no irretrievable commitment of resources. Id §§ 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
38. See supra note 35.
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den remains on an acting agency to demonstrate compliance with

section 7(a)(2).
Congress' objective to continue to place the burden on agencies
to insure that their actions do not jeopardize endangered species is

also evidenced by congressional hearings. Throughout the 1978 and
1979 amendment process, Congress analyzed and discussed the judi-

cial opinions which had interpreted section

7.39

Had it disapproved

of the judicial practice of placing the burden on the agency to show

"no jeopardization," Congress could have explicitly rejected this requirement by an appropriate provision in the amended Act. Instead,

Congress expressed approval of the interpretation given section 7 by

the courts. 40 Congress emphasized that the amended language of the

section "continues to give the benefit of the doubt to the species and
it would continue to place the burden on the action agency' '4 1to
demonstrate . . . that its action will not violate section 7(a)(2).
V.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
APPROACHES

7(a)(2):

DIVERGENT

Even though the 1978 and 1979 amendments to the ESA reflect

a congressional intent to place the burden on agencies to prove compliance with section 7(a)(2), subsequent judicial opinions have been

inconsistent in the standard of review applied to agency actions

under this section. Conflicting approaches include the District of

Columbia's reasonableness standard of review42 and the First Circuit's probing inquiry analysis.4 3 A third approach, originating in
the Alaska District Court, 44 combines the District of Columbia and
First Circuit standards of review by analyzing certain agency actions
under a reasonableness standard and others under a more probing
standard.
A.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals Approach: A

Reasonableness Standard of Review
Ignoring congressional intent to the contrary, the District of
39. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin
1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2576; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9484, 9486;
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9453, 9460-6 1.
40. See supra note 39.
41. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2576.
42. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 686 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
43. See Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
44. See Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983).
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Columbia Court of Appeals applies a 45
minimal level of review to
7(a)(2).
section
with
compliance
agency
The court first applied deferential review in North Slope Borough v. Andrus 46 which involved the federal portion of the same
leasing program challenged in Hammond 47 Similar to Hammond,
the issue inAndrus was whether the leasing program interfered with
the endangered bowhead Whales' migration through the Beaufort
Sea to such an extent as to violate the requirements of section
7(a)(2). In holding that the Secretary of Interior had not violated
section 7(a)(2), theAndrus court concluded: "The proposed 'agency
action' in the Beaufort Sea has not beenfound likely to jeopardize an
endangered species .... "48 There is a substantial difference between the Andrus conclusion that an action has not "been found
likely to jeopardize" and the section 7(a)(2) mandate that an agency
"insure that any action. . . is not likely to jeopardize." The former
standard imposes the burden on a third party to show that an agency
action is likely to jeopardize an endangered species; the latter places
the burden on the agency to demonstrate that its affirmative actions
are not likely to jeopardize an endangered species.
Additional proof that theAndrus court placed the burden not on
the acting agency to demonstrate "no jeopardization," but on a third
party to show "jeopardization," is the standard of review employed
by the Andrus court in analyzing section 7(a)(2) compliance. In
holding that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had fulfilled
its section 7(a)(2) responsibilities by complying with the mitigation
measures recommended by the National Marines Fisheries Services
45. Another court that applies a minimal level of review is the Hawaii District
Court. In Stop H-3 Association v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp. 149 (D. Hawaii 1982), the
controversy centered around the construction of Interstate Defense Highway H-3,
alleged to jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered Oahu creeper. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) relied on a biological opinion by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) in order to justify its decision to construct the highway. Id at 174. To determine if DOT had complied with section
7(a)(2), the court did not require the agency to come forward with sufficient evidence to prove "no jeopardization." The court instead subjected the evidence on
which DOT relied to a bare minimum review:

While it is true that conditions for bird sighting were suboptimal at the
time of the survey, it cannot be concluded that as a matteroflaw the sur-

vey data was insufficient to support a biological opinion or that the conclusion drawn from the data was clearly erroneous. Based upon the survey,
the USFWS could reasonably have concluded that the H-3 project is not

likely to jeopardize the existence of the Oahu Creeper.
Id at 174 (latter emphasis added).
46. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
47. 645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982). See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
48. Andrus, 642 F.2d at 607 (emphasis added).
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(NMFS), 4 9

the court employed the deferential standard: reasonableness. 50 If the court had subjected the BLM's actions to any stricter

review under section 7(a)(2), it would have concluded that the
agency had not fulfilled the mandate of section 7(a)(2). There was

substantial evidence, including warnings by NMFS, which indicated
that even with mitigation measures the bowhead whale might still be

5
jeopardized by oil exploration and drilling. '

The Andrus standard of review was subsequently affirmed in
CabinetMountains Wilderness v. Peterson.52 CabinetMountains Wilderness, which concerned mineral leasing in the Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness Area, further illustrates the deferential approach that the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals applies to determine compliance with section 7(a)(2). Had the court in CabinetMountains Wilderness placed the burden on the Forest Service to show "no
jeopardization," the mineral leasing would have been disallowed.
Two of the three principal problems which formed the basis for the

conclusion in the biological opinion - that the leasing was likely to
jeopardize the endangered grizzly bear - were not mitigated in the
final Forest Service contract.5 3 The court avoided this result and upheld the lease by subjecting the Forest Service's decision to a reasonableness standard of review, thereby shifting the burden to a third
party to show that the Forest Service's actions would be likely to
54
"jeopardize" the grizzly bear.
49. Id at 610.

50. Id at 609.
51. The Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) indicated that oil spills could have a devastating effect on the
endangered bowhead and gray whales: "Based on the worst case assumptions identified in Section III, the bowhead and gray whales could be severely affected."
BLM-Environmental Impact Statement, quoted in North Slope Borough v. Andrus,
486 F. Supp. 332, 341 (D.D.C.), affd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C.

Cir. 1980). In addition, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) indicated
that insufficient evidence existed to determine whether the lease sale would jeopardize the whales. North Slope Borough, 486 F. Supp. at 341. Moreover, NMFS advised BLM that based on the available data NMFS did have, the BLM should adopt
certain mitigation measures. One measure, prohibition of all drilling between
March 31 and November 1 (whale migration season), was not incorporated by the
BLM in its final lease sale contract. Id at 342. The district court concluded that in
the wake of this evidence, the BLM "would have no grounds for insuring the safety
of the Bowhead," and if the BLM allowed the lease sale to proceed, this would be a
"flagrant violation of Section 7(a)(2)." Id at 358.
52. 685 F.2d 678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53. These two problems were the already "precarious status" of the grizzly bear
population in the Cabinet Mountains Wilderness Area, and the decreasing amount
of habitat available to the grizzlies. Id at 680.
54. The court held: "The Forest Service reasonablyconcluded that the project
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly bears." Id at 687 (emphasis added).
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The First Circuit Approach: A Probing Inquiry into Actions
Alleged to Violate Section 7(a)(2)

Unlike the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit analyzes section 7(a)(2) compliance in a
manner consistent with congressional intent:55 the court subjects
agency actions to rigorous review, thereby placing the burden on
agencies to demonstrate that their actions are not likely to
56
"jeopardize."
In Roosevelt Campobello InternationalPark v. EPA, 57 the Environmental Protection Agencys' (EPA) decision to grant a construction permit to Pittston Oil Refinery was reviewed by the First Circuit
in order to determine if the agency had complied with the section
7(a)(2) "is not likely to jeopardize" requirement. The EPA granted
the permit based on conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) who had presided over the permit application hearing. 58
Whether the EPA complied with section 7(a)(2) thus depended directly on the adequacy and correctness of the ALJ's conclusions.
If the Roosevelt Campobello court had followed the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' approach and inquired into the reasonableness of the ALJ's findings, it would have upheld the decision:
sufficient evidence existed to support the ALJ's determinations.5 9 Ignoring the reasonableness standard of review, the Roosevelt Campobello court adopted a more probing standard of review. The court
required the agency to show that the ALJ's finding insured "no jeopardization." The court emphasized that the precise effects of the
refinery on the humpback whale and bald eagle could not be determined absent "real time simulation studies. ' 60 As a result of the
EPA's failure to conduct these studies, the ALJ could not insure the
55. See .upra notes 13-20 and accompanying text, notes 35-41 and accompanymng text.
56. Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982). A
district court in California is in accord with Roosevelt Campobello in placing the
burden on the acting agency to show "no jeopardization." In Pacific LegalFound v.
Watt, the court held that the Environmental Protection Agency had not "demonstrated compliance" with section 7(a)(2); that is, it did not insure "that the requirements contained in the permit will not jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species." Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 539 F. Supp. 841,
847 (C.D. Cal. 1982), modfied, 703 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1983).
57. 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).

58. Id at 1050. Specifically, the ALJ found that the "overwhelming weight of
evidence pointed to the feasibility of safe transit" of the oil tankers. Id at 1054.
59. Id at 1051-52 (the AL's conclusion that the risk of a major oil spill was
negligible was based on four sources: the Coast Guard, computer simulation studies, evidence concerning weather patterns in Eastport, Maine, and portions of the

Environmental Impact Statement).
60. Id at 1055. The court defined "real time simulation studies" as "tests run
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safety of the endangered species. 6 ' Because the ALJ could not inthe EPA did not satisfy
sure "no jeopardization," the court held that
' 62
its burden of showing "no jeopardization.
C.

The Alaska District Court Approach: Judicial Confusion in
Village of False Pass v. Watt

The most recent decision interpreting section 7(a)(2), Village of
FalsePass v. Watt 63 suffers from a form of schizophrenia: a reason-

ableness standard of review is intertwined with a more probing level
of review. In one part of the opinion, the court used strong language
reminiscent of the Roosevelt Campobello level of review:
[The agency] must insure that agency actions are not likely to
This duty
jeopardize the continued existence of the species ....
is violated if the agency fails to initiate feasible and necessary tests
or studies .... The amendments continue to give the benefit of
the doubt to the species .... 64
Yet, in resolving whether the Secretary of Interior actually complied
with section 7(a)(2), the court sporadically ignored the searching

above passage in favor of the deferlevel of review mandated by the
65
ential reasonableness inquiry.

with actual tanker pilots on a device capable of simulating the responses of a ship to
certain conditions of wind, tide, fog, [and] current." Id at 1051 n.6.
61. Id at 1055.
62. Id at 1057.
63. 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983).
64. Id at 1154.
65. To understand the various levels of review exhibited by the court in Village
of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983), a brief digression into the
facts is necessary. The plaintiffs alleged that offshore oil exploration in the St.
George Basin of Alaska's Bering Sea would jeopardize the continued existence of
the endangered right and gray whales. Id at 1131. The biological opinion issued
by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for the St. George Basin indicated that an oil spill or blowout in either spring or fall would jeopardize the gray
whales. Id at 1158. Further, the opinion noted that geophysical seismic surveys
would also jeopardize the whales depending on the existence of certain unknown
contingencies. Id at 1159. To alleviate the jeopardization presented by the oil exploration activities, the biological opinion recommended two mitigation measures:
(1) an assurance by the Secretary of Interior that there be no oil spills in the area
of right and gray whale migration; and (2) regulation of seismic operations in such
a manner as not to disturb the essential activities of the whales. Id at 1159. These
mitigation measures could have been fulfilled only with substantial monitoring systems and readily available emergency equipment, neither of which was specifically
provided for in the lease stipulations. See id at 1161-62. Nevertheless, the court
held that the Secretary had fulfilled the first mitigation requirement by including in
the contract the various lease stipulations. Id In contrast, the court held that the
lease stipulations were insufficient to comply with the second mitigation measure.
Id at 1162. To arrive at these inconsistent conclusions, the court must have deferred to the Secretary's decision as to the fulfillment of the first mitigation recom-
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There is only one plausible explanation for the judicial schizophrenia exhibited by the False Pass court: it was uncertain whether,
under section 7(a)(2), it should place the burden on the agency to
show "no jeopardization" or on a third party to show "jeopardization." If the court had examined the legislative intent behind the
ESA, it would have ascertained that Congress desires a probing level
of review, that the legislative directive is to the agencies to insure
to jeopardize the continued existthat their activities are not likely
66
ence of endangered species.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even though judicial opinions after the 1978 and 1979 ESA
amendments are in disagreement concerning the standard of review
applicable to alleged section 7(a)(2) violations, the congressional intent is clear: agencies have a duty to insure that their actions are not
likely to "jeopardize" endangered species. A deferential, reasonableness standard of review, one that places the burden on a third
party to show that agency action is "jeopardizing" an endangered
species, is insufficient to hold agencies to this affirmative duty.
Courts must be willing to actively scrutinize agency actions by placing the burden on the agency to demonstrate that its actions are not
likely to "jeopardize" an endangered species. Only then will the judiciary fulfill the unequivocal intent of Congress.
The Alaska Supreme Court in Hammond ignored congressional
intent by accepting the reasoning of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in Andrus, that is, applying a reasonableness standard of
review to agency actions alleged to violate section 7(a)(2). No explanation or justification was offered by the Hammond court for its
seemingly blind adherence toAndrus. The court's only statement on
the issue was that it was adopting the holding of the Andrus case.
For this reason, the holding must be regarded as an exercise in judicial lethargy.
Lou Harrison

mendation, while at the same time having subjected compliance of the second
mitigation measure to a more searching review.
66. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text, notes 35-41 and accompanying text.

